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LIFE ON A FEDERAL ISLAND IN THE CIVILIAN SEA
William E. Crawford*
The Louisiana lawyer practicing both in state court and in the federal system is
subject to legal schizophrenia as a normal way of life.1 The first reason for this
schizophrenia is that under civilian doctrine the basic private law of Louisiana is
limited to the law declared in the Civil Code and other legislation. 2 Its interpreta-
tion by the Louisiana judiciary, no matter how often repeated, uniform, or con-
sistent, does not constitute law under the faithfully-held doctrine of jurisprudence
constante as specifically pronounced by the Louisiana Supreme Court,3 in keeping
with the long-standing tradition of the civilian notion of law as opposed to inter-
pretation of the law by the judiciary.
In Louisiana there is no rule of stare decisis; instead its counterpart of jurispru-
dence constante prevails. Thus, a federal court sitting in a diversity case, in which
it must apply Louisiana substantive law under the Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins
rule, 4 must apply the appropriate Louisiana legislation, as distinguished from in-
terpretations of the legislation pronounced in cases dealing with it; therefore, it is
not bound to apply interpretations of that legislation found in Louisiana decisions,
for those decisions do not bind the Louisiana judiciary itself in later cases.' Never-
theless, while the federal court is not bound by the jurisprudence, it would be un-
reasonable for the federal bench to ignore the interpretations found in Louisiana
decisions unless they are manifestly inappropriate, for the very purpose of Erie is
to instruct the federal judiciary in a diversity case to apply the applicable state law
in the manner in which it would be applied in the state courts.6 Determining the
governing Louisiana interpretation pronounced through the judiciary can thus be
uncertain.
Ascertaining the correct rule of law can be difficult for the additional reason
that the Louisiana appellate judiciary in 1992 rendered from the courts of appeals
a total of 3533 opinions, 7 and from the supreme court, 178,8 contrasted with
the Supreme Court of Mississippi which in 1992 rendered only 386 dispositions
* James J. Bailey Professor of Law, Louisiana State University Law Center. The research and analysis of John
Felder Crawford, II, research assistant for this Article, was indispensable, particularly on the matters of jurispru-
dence constante and the federal treatment of Louisiana products liability cases.
1. The late Judge Alvin B. Rubin visited this area in his article, Hazards of a Civilian Venturer in a Federal
Court: Travel and Travail on the Erie Railroad, 48 LA. L. REV. 1369 (1988).
2. LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 1 (West 1993).
3. Ardoin v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 360 So. 2d 1331, 1334 (La. 1978).
4. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, cert. denied, 305 U.S. 637 (1938).
5. Clarkco Contractors, Inc. v. Texas E. Gas Pipeline Co., A Div. of Tex. E. Transmission Corp., 615 F.
Supp. 775, 778 (M.D. La. 1985).
6. Erie, 304 U.S. at 72-73.
7. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA 26 (1992). There were
2511 civil and 1022 criminal opinions from the courts of appeals in 1992. Id.
8. Id. at 23. There were 131 civil opinions from the supreme court and 47 criminal opinions. Id.
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by signed opinion.9 This proliferation of jurisprudence tends to diffuse any sharp
and precise statements of law.
Another source of schizophrenia-inducing difference in the two systems lies in
the procedural area. Louisiana has a fact-pleading system of procedure, as op-
posed to the notice pleading procedure of the federal system. Even more signifi-
cant is the Louisiana system of appellate review of fact. The Louisiana appellate
judiciary has the constitutional authority to reverse the findings of a jury on the
facts and to render a contrary judgment on the spot, from the appellate bench.1 A
Louisiana appellate court thus has the authority to review the transcript on appeal
from a case in which the jury found that the defendant was not negligent; deter-
mine that the jury was clearly wrong in its finding; enter its own finding that negli-
gence did occur; if there is evidence in the trial record to support it, make a finding
of the damages and quantum to which the plaintiff is entitled; and then render
judgment accordingly against the defendant from the appellate bench, without re-
mand and without a further right of appeal.
This procedure is possible only because there is no constitutional right to a civil
jury trial in Louisiana. 1 The Seventh Amendment guarantees a civil jury trial un-
der the United States Constitution in the federal system, ensuring that a defendant
winning his case before a jury in federal court - if the jury charges contained no
error and if sufficient evidence supported the jury verdict- can feel comfortable
that the case is over as to factual issues. This same federal guarantee of a civil jury
trial controls summary judgment practice and dispositions by federal judges on
motions for directed verdicts, motions for JNOV, rulings on questions of evidence
before the jury, and any other handling of findings or rulings on factual issues, for
factual issues must be left to the jury, not determined by the court.12
In this same vein, the traditional proximate cause issue in Louisiana is known
as the duty/risk analysis. Under the leading Louisiana case, this analysis is a ques-
tion for the court, not the jury." If a federal judge were to determine a proximate
cause issue by invoking the duty/risk analysis, he would violate the parties'
Seventh Amendment rights. Thus, the lawyer in Louisiana's state court system
must prepare his trial and his appellate argument in terms of duty/risk, while in the
federal system he must follow the traditional proximate cause analysis found in the
other states.
9. ANNUAL REPORT FOR THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI 27 (1992).
10. LA. CONST. of 1974, art. V, § 5(C).
11. Melancon v. McKeithen, 345 F. Supp. 1025, 1045 (E.D. La.), affid, 409 U.S. 943 (1972), and affd, 409
U.S. 1098 (1973).
12. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 50.
13. "Regardless if stated in terms of proximate cause, legal cause, or duty, the scope of the duty inquiry is
ultimately a question of policy as to whether the particular risk falls within the scope of the duty." Roberts v.
Benoit, 605 So. 2d 1032, 1044 (La. 1991).
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I. DETERMINING THE Erie RULE OF LAW IN LOUISIANA
The most recent Erie mandate on a federal court is that it should seek the cor-
rect statement of law in the same fashion that the highest court of the state (in
which the federal court sits) would search, evaluate, and pronounce it. 4 The Erie
mandate may then subdivide into two significantly different intellectual endeav-
ors: the Erie evaluation;1 5 and, on the other hand, the Erie guess. 6
A. The Erie Evaluation
The Erie mandate as followed in common law states by the federal courts is cor-
rectly summed up by the following statement: "A federal court sitting in diversity
jurisdiction and called upon in that role to apply state law is absolutely bound by a
current interpretation of that law formulated by the state's highest tribunal." 7
Clarkco Contractors, Inc. v. Texas Eastern Gas Pipeline Co., A Division of Texas
Eastern Transmission Corp. 18 is an excellent illustration of the Erie evaluation
process by a federal judge sitting in Louisiana. The issue before the district court
was whether to apply a contractual stipulation of a choice of law provision, or to
decline to apply the stipulation on the ground that to do so would contravene a
strong public policy rule of Louisiana.19 Following the Erie mandate, the court at-
tempted to determine whether Louisiana had departed from the lex loci delicti rule
in tort cases.2" After a detailed consideration of the relevant cases and jurispru-
dence, the court referred to the opinion of the Louisiana Supreme Court in the
leading case, Jagers v. Royal Indemnity Co. ;21 but it then followed the observation
of the Fifth Circuit, that "Jagers is far from clear,"22 and concluded that one could
not rely on Jagers to say that Louisiana had departed from the lex loci delicti rule -
that Louisiana had firmly adopted the interest analysis considered in Jagers.2 3
At this point, the judge, referring to jurisprudence constante, observed that
Louisiana civilian tradition did not require him to find Jagers controlling: "[Iln a
civilian jurisdiction such as Louisiana, it is risky business to rely overly much
upon extensions of judicial decisions as stating the applicable law, particularly
where, as here, Article 10 of the Civil Code provides a statutory basis for the
law. . "24
14. CHARLES A. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 58, at 373 (4th ed. 1983).
15. Clarkco Contractors, Inc. v. Texas E. Gas Pipeline Co., A Div. of Tex. E. Transmission Corp., 615 F.
Supp. 775, 776 (M.D. La. 1985).
16. Thompson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 714 F2d 581, 582 (5th Cir..1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S.
1102 (1984).
17. Daigle v. Maine Medical Ctr., Inc., 14 F.3d 684, 689 (1st Cir. 1994).
18. 615 F Supp. 775 (M.D. La. 1985).
19. Id. at 776.
20. Id. at 777. Lex loci delicti refers to the "place of the wrong." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 911 (6th ed. 1990).
21. 276 So. 2d 309 (La. 1973).
22. Lee v. Hunt, 631 F.2d 1171, 1175 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 834 (1981).
23. Clarkco Contractors, Inc. v. Texas E. Gas Pipeline Co., A Div. of Tex. E. Transmission Corp., 615 F
Supp. 775, 777 (M.D. La. 1985).
24. Id. at 778 (footnote omitted).
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Footnote two of the Clarkco opinion articulates so fully and with such great rel-
evance the entire Erie evaluation process under jurisprudence constante that it is
set forth herein in full.2" Whether an Erie search under the rule of stare decisis26
would yield a different-sounding discussion is beyond the shore of this civilian
sea.
The essence of the theory ofjurisprudence constante, as recognized by the judge
in Clarkco, is that judicial precedent is established by a judge on the basis of gen-
eral rules of law provided by legislators for the decision of those disputes, and is
not based on the general rules of law extracted from judicial precedent.27 The ac-
cumulated precedents gain significance because the words of the legislation, as
consistently spoken by judges in their decisions, are attributed to the legislator,
and-the meaning of the rule of law enacted by the legislator is taken from the spe-
cific meaning given to it by judges.28 Further, the judge analyzes those judicial de-
cisions to determine whether or not they comprise a general rule of law consistent
with the needs of the pending case.2 If what he finds does not fit the needs of the
case, then he may disregard the law as spoken by the judges and "return to the
words of the general rule of law spoken by the legislator, under the theory that
judges are bound to apply the law as given to them by the legislature and not as
paraphrased by other judges.'
The Louisiana Supreme Court, explaining the doctrine, said in part:
In Louisiana, courts are not bound by the doctrine of stare decisis, but there is a rec-
ognition in this State of the doctrine of jurisprudence constante. Unlike stare decisis,
this latter doctrine does not contemplate adherence to a principle of law announced
and applied on a single occasion in the past.
However, when, by repeated decisions in a long line of cases, a rule of law has
been accepted and applied by the courts, these adjudications assume the dignity of
25. Footnote two states:
For example, Johnson v. St. Paul Mercury Ins[urance] Co., while distaining [sic] the doctrine of stare
decisis did recognize the doctrine of jurisprudence constante. After citing a long line of Louisiana cases
stretching over a seventy year period applying the lex loci delicti doctrine as the "established rule," the
court noted: "Fundamental and elementary principles recognize that certainty and constancy of the law
are indispensable to orderly social intercourse, a sound economic climate and a stable government."
[Johnson,] 236 So.2d [sic] at 218. Exactly three years laterJohnson was expressly overruled by Jagers v.
Royal Indemnity Co.
Louisiana looks first to statutory law. "In deciding the issue before us the lower courts did not
follow the process of referring first to the code and other legislative sources but treated language from
a judicial opinion as the primary source of law. This is an indication that the position of the decided
case as an illustration of past experience and the theory of the individualization of decision have not
been properly understood by our jurists in many instances."
[Ardoin v. Hartford Accident & lndem. Co.,] 360 So.2d [sic] [1331,] 1334 [(La. 1978)]. Louisiana has
no legislative conflict of laws rule in tort cases. It may be important to bear in mind that the Restatement
(Second) Conflicts of Laws (1969) has not been adopted by the Louisiana Legislature as a part of the
Civil Code; Article 10 is a part of the Code.
Clarkco Contractors, 615 F. Supp. at 778 n.2 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
26. "To abide by, or adhere to, decided cases." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1406 (6th ed. 1990).
27. JULIO C. CUETO-RUA, JUDICIAL METHODS OF INTERPRETATION OF THE LAW 70 (1981).
28. Id. at 74.
29. Id. at 76.
30. Id. at 77.
[Vol: 15:1
LIFE ON A FEDERAL ISLAND IN THE CIVILIAN SEA
jurisprudence constante; and the rule of law upon which they are based is entitled to
great weight in subsequent decisions.31
It is thus submitted that the federal judges sitting in Louisiana are not bound by
the recent pronouncements in Gauthier v. O'Brien
32 and Touchard v. Williams,33
each of which is a single Louisiana Supreme Court pronouncement as to the mean-
ing or interpretation of Article 2324 of the Civil Code, which regulates solidary
liability among joint tortfeasors. " On the face of those opinions, compared to the
legislators' words they interpret, there is room to differ seriously with whether the
cases are correct interpretations of the law. According to all of the foregoing ex-
position of the doctrine of jurisprudence constante, a federal judge sitting in
Louisiana under the mandate of Erie, with the corollary doctrine of jurisprudence
constante, is not bound to follow those decisions. The keystone of this proposition
is that the Erie mandate directs a federal judge to incorporate the doctrine of
jurisprudence constante into his divining of the Louisiana substantive law applica-
ble to the case before him, 3 an evaluation process that must go beyond the most
recent Louisiana Supreme Court opinion.
B. The Erie Guess
In Thompson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. , the court in a diversity case had
the following issue: "This Louisiana diversity appeal requires us to determine
whether the law of that state would dispense with proof of causation against some
of [the] multiple defendants in an asbestosis case. '37 The court found that
Louisiana had not adopted such a dispensation of proof in any reported case, that
the theories advanced by the plaintiff represented radical departures from tradi-
tional theories of tort liability, and that the only support for the plaintiffs claim as
to Louisiana law was a supposed tendency of Louisiana courts to expand the liabil-
ity of manufacturers, which the court found insufficient to make such an expansion
of Louisiana doctrine.38 The court therefore declined to adopt the theory as the
law of Louisiana. 9
The dissent criticized the majority for making an "Erie guess," saying that the
majority was predicting what the Louisiana courts would do, and that such a case
of first impression should be determined by a certification of the question to the
Louisiana Supreme Court.4"
31. Johnson v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 236 So. 2d 216, 218 (La. 1970), overruled by Jagers v. Royal In-
dem. Co., 276 So. 2d 309 (La. 1973).
32. 618 So. 2d 825 (La. 1993) (interpreting revised Article 2324 of the Civil Code).
33. 617 So. 2d 885 (La. 1993) (interpreting revised Article 2324 of the Civil Code).
34. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2324 (West 1979 & Supp. 1994).
35. Clarkco Contractors, Inc. v. Texas E. Gas Pipeline Co., A Div. of Tex. E. Transmission Corp., 615 F
Supp. 775, 778 (M.D. La. 1985).
36. 714 F.2d 581 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1102 (1984).
37. Thompson, 714 F.2d at 581.
38. Id. at 583.
39. Id.
40. Id. (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
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In discussions of the doctrine of jurisprudence constante, frequent reference is
made to the fact that legislation (which includes the Civil Code and other statutes)
is the primary source of law. There should be no hiatus, no question on which the
law does not speak, because of Article 4 of the Civil Code, which provides that
when there is no applicable rule in the legislation, the court must proceed accord-
ing to equity - resorting to "justice, reason, and prevailing usages."41
If the theory and doctrine of judicial application of law operates as the
Louisiana Supreme Court has stated and as commentators have frequently writ-
ten, it is submitted that the majority in Thompson was completely correct in decid-
ing the case on its own legal analysis because it was simply obeying the mandate of
Erie and the civilian process in Louisiana, particularly in view of the positive di-
rective in Article 4 of the Civil Code. Thus, if there are no cases, then the court
must itself go to the legislative source, and if there is no legislative source specifi-
cally applicable, then the Civil Code commands that the court resort to "equity."42
Can it be said that there is no applicable rule of Louisiana law on a question simply
because there is no appellate court opinion pronouncing a rule? The Civil Code is
a positive statement to the contrary. A federal judge sitting in Louisiana should
never consider himself to be making a guess, for he is only applying the law as the
civilian system commands the judge to do. He is likewise, as a federal judge, com-
manded to follow the state civilian theory, which, it is submitted, is inherent in the
mandate of Erie as applied to Louisiana.
C. Current Practice with Certification of Questions
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 13:72.1 provides that the Supreme Court
or the circuit courts of appeals of the United States may certify questions to the
Louisiana Supreme Court, "which certificate the supreme court of this state may,
by written opinion, answer."' Rule XII of the Louisiana Supreme Court Rules im-
plements the foregoing statutory provision, but adds an interesting sentence: "This
court may, in its discretion, decline to answer the questions certified to it."44
The certification of questions has been used heavily in Louisiana. Electronic
research shows that from April 19, 1963, through July 22, 1994, a total of eighty-
nine questions were certified from federal court.4" The questions ranged across
the spectrum of legal issues.46 By contrast, the Fifth Circuit has certified to the
Mississippi Supreme Court from November 30, 1964, through October 19, 1992,
only forty-one questions.47 A substantial number of major pronouncements by the
Louisiana Supreme Court - fundamental to different areas of the law, though with
41. "When no rule for a particular situation can be derived from legislation or custom, the court is bound to
proceed according to equity. To decide equitably, resort is made to justice, reason, and prevailing usages." LA.
CIv. CODE ANN. art. 4 (West 1993).
42. Id.
43. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:72.1 (West 1983).
44. LA. Sup. CT. R. XII.
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a heavy concentration in the torts area48- have been in response to the certified
question procedure.
It is difficult to find a sharp distinction among the cases that the Fifth Circuit
chooses to answer for itself, such as Thompson,49 as opposed to those in which it
certifies the question, such as Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp."° Two very
significant Fifth Circuit opinions, both authored by the late Judge Alvin Rubin,
ruled on the retroactivity vel non of the Louisiana Products Liability Act, without
certifying that question."1 It is an interesting comparison of judicial techniques to
see the exhaustive analysis and research devoted to the questions by Judge Rubin,
as opposed to the terse decree of nonretroactivity by the Louisiana Supreme
Court.52 The principles underlying the doctrine of jurisprudence constante might
well say that it is the federal rule on that question that should be followed, rather
than the Louisiana Supreme Court opinion.
The high court of Maryland responded to a certified question from a federal dis-
trict court in that state. 3 The federal court found the opinion to be unusable, so
that it decided the case using its own legal analysis."
II. APPELLATE REVIEW OF FACT VS.
SEVENTH AMENDMENT GUARANTEE OF JURY TRIAL
Louisiana's constitutional grant ofjurisdiction over the facts as well as the law5
is perhaps a more profound difference between practice in state court and practice
in federal court than is the difference between civil law and common law. As fore-
shadowed in the introductory paragraphs of this Article, the Louisiana appellate
judiciary has the authority not only to reverse the finding of ajury on the facts, but
to pronounce a final judgment from the appellate bench, without remand.56 A de-
fendant thus cast in judgment has no effective right of appeal. He does have the
right to apply for writs from the Louisiana Supreme Court, but of the 1477
applications filed in civil cases in 1993, only 245 were granted. s Jurisdiction of
the facts (and the corollary power to determine them) is not a theoretical or aca-
demic power in the hands of the Louisiana appellate judiciary. As of July 1994,
48. Murray v. Ramada Inns, Inc., 521 So. 2d 1123 (La. 1988); Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 484
So. 2d 110 (La. 1986); Bell v. Jet Wheel Blast, Div. of Ervin Indus., 462 So. 2d 166 (La. 1985); Olsen v. Shell
Oil Co., 365 So. 2d 1285 (La. 1978).
49. Thompson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 714 F.2d 581 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1102
(1984).
50. 484 So. 2d 1l0 (La. 1986).
51. Miles v. Olin Corp., 922 F.2d 1221 (5th Cir. 1991); Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, Inc., 910
F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 171 (1993).
52. Gilboy v. American Tobacco Co., 582 So. 2d 1263 (La. 1991).
53. Kelley v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 497 A.2d 1143 (Md. 1985). See also Delahanty v. Hinckley, 845 F.2d 1069,
1071 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ("Indeed, Kelley's theoretical underpinnings are somewhat unclear.").
54. Kelley, 497 A.2d at 1161-62.
55. "Except as otherwise provided by this constitution, the jurisdiction of the supreme court in civil cases
extends to both law and facts." LA. CONST. of 1974, art. V, § 5(C). The provision for the Louisiana courts of
appeals is essentially the same. Id. § 10(B).
56. Wright v. Paramount-Richards Theatres, Inc., 198 F2d 303, 306 (5th Cir. 1952).
57. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA 23 (1993).
1994]
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electronic research showed that among the courts of appeals and the supreme
court since 1983, jury verdicts were reversed on the facts in approximately 173
cases.58 The jury was reversed on quantum in approximately 116 cases.59 This is
not to say that in all those cases final judgments contrary to the jury verdict were
rendered on the spot from the appellate bench.
The federal courts have long been aware of this difference in jurisdiction over
facts:
As to the sufficiency of the evidence on the issues of negligence and contributory
negligence, we are governed by the standard developed in Boeing Co. v. Shipman.
Louisiana appellate courts, on the other hand, have the right and the duty to review
both the law and the facts in civil cases. "As a consequence of that situation, in civil
cases federal courts evaluating decisions of Louisiana state courts as precedents
have the difficult task of separating the decisions of the Louisiana courts on the law
from their review of the facts."60
The practice in the courts of Louisiana was set forth in Wright v. Paramount-
Richards Theatres, Inc. :6
In the state of Louisiana, the principles of the common law are not recog-
nized; neither do the principles of the civil law of Rome furnish the basis of
their jurisprudence. They have a system peculiar to themselves, adopted by
their statutes, which embodies much of the civil law, some of the principles of
the common law, and, in a few instances, the statutory provisions of other
states. This system may be called the civil law of Louisiana, and is peculiar to
that state.
Continuing to describe the Louisiana practice, Mr. Justice McLean said[:] "The
facts found by the jury are examined by the appellate court, and its judgment is given
on the facts, without the intervention of a jury."
In Louisiana state courts, the right to trial by jury guaranteed by the Seventh
Amendment of the United States Constitution does not exist. The Louisiana Code of
Practice of 1870 provides for jury trials in certain civil cases; but appellate courts
have the right and duty to review both the law and the facts in all civil cases.
Federal courts are forbidden by the Seventh Amendment to re-examine any fact
tried by a jury otherwise than according to the rules of the common law, while
Louisiana state courts can review the facts in all civil cases. As a consequence of that
situation, in civil jury cases federal courts evaluating decisions of Louisiana
state courts as precedents have the difficult task of separating the decisions of the
Louisiana courts on the law from their review of facts. 2
58. Electronic data (on file with the Mississippi College Law Review).
59. Electronic data (on fde with the Mississippi College Law Review).
60. Miskell v. Southern Food Co., 439 F.2d 790, 792 (5th Cir. 1971) (citations omitted) (emphasis added)
(quoting Wright, 198 F.2d at 306).
61. 198 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1952).
62. Id. at 306 (quoting Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 450, 451 (1830)).
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A recent case illustrating the exercise of this authority is Hines v. Remington
Arms Co.63 The plaintiff was severely injured when his rifle accidentally fired into
a gun powder canister.64 The rifle was used purely for competition shooting and
had a very sensitive trigger which allegedly discharged when the bullet was cham-
bered, without any deliberate pulling of the trigger itself." The facts were that the
plaintiff fired the rifle with the muzzle six to eight inches from the cardboard can-
ister of powder.6 The claim against Remington was dismissed at an early stage, 7
and the case proceeded against the manufacturer of the powder and against the
maker of the rifle. The jury found both defendants not liable because neither the
rifle nor the gun powder was defective.69 The court of appeals reversed the jury
verdict and found the maker of the rifle liable under the per se liability theory for
an unreasonably dangerous product,7" and found the powder manufacturer liable
for failure to warn as to safe storage of the gun powder.71 The court of appeals
awarded a judgment of $2,000,000 in general damages to the victim himself and
then awarded $50,000 to his wife for her loss of consortium.72 Attorney's fees
were awarded under Louisiana Civil Code Article 2545 in the amount of twenty-
five percent of the total judgment against the maker of the rifle.73 All told, the
judgment awarded was in the sum of $2,458,128.92, not including the consor-
tium award of $50,000. 7' At the same time, the court fixed the allocation of fault
at thirty-four percent to the plaintiff, and thirty-three percent to each of the defend-
ants .71 This was all determined from the appellate bench, without remand ;76 there
was no effective appeal from this judgment.
A second example of Louisiana courts' authority over factual issues is set out in
Weatherford v. Commercial Union Insurance Co. 77 A priest was driving his car and
saw the eight-year-old victim riding in the same direction on his new bicycle. 78 As
Father Termini rounded a curve, the victim suddenly turned his bicycle to the
right, directly into the path of Termini's vehicle. 79 The jury found he was not negli-
gent.8" The court of appeals reviewed the record and stated:
63. 630 So. 2d 809 (La. Ct. App. 1993).
64. Id. at 812.
65.Id. at 813.
66. Id. at 812.
67. Id. at 813.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 812.
70.Id. at 814.
71. Id. at 817.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 819.
74. Id. at 817.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 820.
77. 637 So. 2d 1208 (La. Ct. App. 1994).
78. Id. at 1209.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1210.
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However, under the facts and circumstances here presented, we are convinced that
the jury manifestly erred in its determination. Considering the high degree of care
that is required of a motorist when he sees a young child on the road, neither the
jurisprudence nor the evidence supports the jury's determination that Father
Termini was not negligent in the manner in which he operated his vehicle shortly
prior to and at the time of the accident.81
A third example is Beckham v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. 82 This case
was tried to the court without a jury. 83 The judge found the defendant surgeon not
liable, concluding that he had not committed medical malpractice.' The court of
appeals reversed the judgment, found the defendant negligent, 8 and from the ap-
pellate bench awarded a judgment of $144,221.17 with interest and costs.
86
It is typical in these cases that the reversal of the jury verdict is not based upon
an error in the charge to the jury. In fact, the Louisiana Supreme Court has ad-
monished the courts of appeals that, if in reviewing a record the court discovers an
error in the charge, they are to formulate a correct charge for themselves, read the
transcript, and render judgment accordingly, without remand, taking cognizance
of the correct statement of law. 87 The significance of a clear statement of the law is
thus much diminished in the Louisiana system of appellate review of fact.88
On the other hand, an accurate statement of the law is sacramental if the case is
being tried in a federal court under the Seventh Amendment guarantee of a jury
trial. If on review by the federal court of appeals a substantial error was found in
the jury charge, the verdict, whether for the plaintiff or for the defendant, would
be set aside and the case remanded for trial under the correct charge.89 Electronic
research has shown that this reversal ofjury verdicts is virtually nonexistent in the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. In the last compilation of figures, over a period of
seventy-five years, until 1987 when the review was last accomplished, only thir-
teen cases had been reversed on the facts." Contrary to the Louisiana system, in
none of those cases could the federal circuit court of appeals render a final judg-
ment against a defendant from the appellate bench.
A. Duty/Risk vs. Proximate Cause
The judicially-adopted and certified mode of analysis for actions ex delicto is
described as the duty/risk analysis. The significant difference between the duty/
risk analysis and the traditional proximate cause analysis (as set forth by Justice
81. Id.
82. 614 So. 2d 760 (La. Ct. App. 1993).
83. Id. at 763.
84. Id.
85.Id. at 767.
86. Id. at 772.
87. See Gonzales v. Xerox Corp., 320 So. 2d 163, 165 (La. 1975).
88. Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 443 (1830).
89. WRIGHT, supra note 14, § 94, at 630.
90. William E. Crawford, Should Louisiana Retain Civil Appellate Review of Facts?, 35 LA. B.J. 245, 250
(1987).
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Andrews in his dissent to Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co.91) is that, under the
duty/risk analysis, the issue of whether the harm to the plaintiff was foreseeable to
the defendant is treated as a question of policy or law, rather than one of fact. The
question is asked whether the risk of the injury that occurred fell within the ambit
of the duty incumbent upon the defendant. The leading case on this point holds that
the decision is one of policy.92 The case does not go so far as to say that it is a ques-
tion of law, but it is well-recognized that questions of policy are for the court,
while questions of fact are for the jury. Thus, in federal court under the civil jury
trial guarantee, a proximate cause issue in the traditional sense must be accorded
to the jury because what constitutes a question of fact under the Seventh Amend-
ment is determined through historic standards-i.e., the questions of fact de-
scribed in the Seventh Amendment are those so classified at the time the
Amendment was adopted in 1791." The earliest torts treatises all classify the
proximate cause issue as a question of fact for the jury. It could therefore make a
significant difference in the outcome of a case involving a substantial proximate
cause question as to whether the parties found themselves in federal court or in
state court, in the hands of the jury or in the hands of the judge.
B. Precedential Value of Appellate Fact Finding
Particularly in the area of products liability, Louisiana appellate courts have
found products to be defective upon reviewing all of the evidence. For Erie pur-
poses, is this a rule of substantive law as to a given product, or is it a finding of
fact, as a matter of law? Several opinions can be construed to be a pronouncement
of substantive law. There are several escalator cases in Louisiana in which children
injured their feet by having them caught between the moving stairs and the side-
wall of the escalator. The leading case stated: "The inescapable conclusion is that
escalators, for all their utility, are unreasonably dangerous to small children ...
Although not unreasonably dangerous 'per se', escalators are unreasonably dan-
gerous to small children, making their manufacturers and custodians strictly liable
for escalator injuries to those children."94
The obvious implication brought forth an application for rehearing which was
denied per curiam:
91. 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
92. Roberts v. Benoit, 605 So. 2d 1032, 1044 (La. 1991). See also the full analysis of the problem by David
W. Robertson, The Precedent Value of Conclusions of Fact in Civil Cases in England and Louisiana, 29 LA. L. REV.
78, 93 (1968).
93. WRIGHT, supra note 14, § 92, at 609.
94. Brown v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 514 So. 2d 439, 444 (La. 1987).
1994l
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It is not our intention to hold that all escalators are unreasonably dangerous to small
children. We merely found that the escalator in this case was unreasonably danger-
ous because of a failure to provide an adequate warning of a danger inherent in the
use of the escalator which was not within the knowledge of or obvious to the ordi-
nary user. This is an independent finding by this court and not an affirmance of the
trial court's directed verdict which was flawed by an error of law.
95
A similar situation, found inAntley v. Yamaha Motor Corp., U. S.A. 9 and Laing
v. American Honda Motor Co. , involved three-wheeler all terrain vehicles, in
which those vehicles were found as a matter of law to be unreasonably dangerous
per se under Louisiana products liability law.
While the problem has not been confronted in a case, the question is raised
whether the Louisiana Court of Appeals has declared as a substantive matter that
escalators are unreasonably dangerous for small children (but for the rehearing per
curiam); and has it been declared as a matter of substantive law that all three-
wheeler all terrain vehicles are actionably defective under products liability law? If
that is the effect of the holding, how would it affect the Erie rule in a diversity case
in federal court involving one of those products? It follows that one would have to
prove only that the accident was caused by a three-wheeler. The question of defec-
tiveness would have been predetermined by the Louisiana appellate opinion al-
ready so holding as a matter of substantive law.
III. CONCLUSION
The Erie mandate to the federal courts sitting in Louisiana in diversity cases
includes the civilian doctrine of jurisprudence constante. The federal judge is not
bound by the last statement of the law pronounced by the appellate courts of
Louisiana, because the doctrine of stare decisis is not found in Louisiana. In the
absence ofjurisprudence on a question, under the Louisiana substantive law found
in the Civil Code, the federal court is free to go to Louisiana legislation and any
other sources of law to answer the question before it as though it were a Louisiana
court; thus, certification seems unnecessary.
In the federal courts sitting in Louisiana, the Seventh Amendment guarantee of
a jury trial prevails over the Louisiana appellate review of fact when questions of
fact are involved. Whether an issue is a question of fact is for the federal court to
decide, and is not governed by the practice of the Louisiana appellate judiciary to
answer questions of fact as matters of law.
95. Brown v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 516 So. 2d 1154, 1154 (La. 1988).
96. 539 So. 2d 696 (La. Ct. App. 1989).
97. 628 So. 2d 196 (La. Ct. App. 1993).
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